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Dan Priel†
(Forthcoming in Problema: Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho.)
Abstract: Many contemporary legal philosophers argue that general jurisprudence is
“descriptive.” I challenge this view in this essay by focusing on one familiar aspect of
jurisprudence: persistent disagreements among legal philosophers. I argue that this fact is
in tension with the claim that jurisprudence is descriptive. I consider several possible
reconciliations of jurisprudential disagreements with descriptivism, but I argue that none
of them succeeds. I then argue that persistent jurisprudential disagreements are easy to
explain from within a normative framework. I conclude by suggesting that legal
philosophers abandon descriptivism in favor of a view that more explicitly sees legal
philosophy as part of normative political philosophy.

From a historical perspective the questions that occupy the center stage of
contemporary analytic jurisprudence are something of a newcomer. The
philosophy of law has been traditionally understood as a normative enterprise
with close relations with moral and political philosophy. This is true of both those
theorists now classified as natural lawyers as it is of those now considered early
exponents of legal positivism. The twentieth century has seen a radical
transformation of this understanding of jurisprudence is about. Following the
very influential work of Hans Kelsen and H.L.A. Hart many legal philosophers,
especially (but not exclusively) legal positivists, have begun to think that the
primary task of jurisprudence is descriptive. According to this view, which I will
call “descriptivism,” jurisprudence is first a conceptual inquiry concerned with
offering an account of the “nature of law,” it is general in the sense that it is
applicable to all legal systems, and it is morally neutral in that it does not pass
judgment on whether law (either in general or any of its particular instantiations)
is morally good or bad. Descriptivists do not deny, of course, that it is possible to
talk about specific laws and to pass moral judgment on them, but they insist that
descriptivism is both possible and that it is a valuable intellectual pursuit. Some
further argue that the descriptive inquiry is logically prior to the normative one.
Their opponents challenge either one of the two elements that make up
descriptivism, insisting that it is impossible to give an account of law that is both
general and does not appeal to moral considerations, and they deny the claim
that to the extent one can describe law, this inquiry enjoys logical priority to
*
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normative questions. Though descriptivism has not been universally accepted, it
remains, I think, the more popular view among contemporary legal philosophers.1
In this essay I challenge descriptivism by arguing that it is inconsistent with the
nature of jurisprudential debates.
I
There are ongoing debates among legal philosophers that purport to be about the
nature of law. By this I do not refer to debates among lawyers about the
“grounds” of law in a given legal system, but to the debates among legal
philosophers themselves about the correct account of the nature of law.2 At their
narrowest these theories purport to be “descriptive” in that they seek to offer an
explanation or explication of what law while leaving open the question of whether
(or when) law is a good or a bad thing. If true, a descriptive theory of law could
be accepted both by the committed legalist and the philosophical anarchist. But
these theories are also descriptive in another, though related, sense. They are said
to be descriptive also in that they purport to tell us what law is without appeal to
normative considerations, or at least without appeal to practical (moral or
political) normative considerations. For convenience I will call the normative
considerations descriptivists allow “non-moral considerations.” The aim of such
an inquiry is to identify what law is, to be able to provide a good classificatory
scheme for distinguishing those things that are law from those things that are not.
The restriction of the inquiry to non-moral considerations is there to identify the
object of inquiry in an objective fashion, not unlike scientists’ identification of the
nature of physical substances. And it is exactly for this reason that the findings
are descriptive also in the first sense: just as the correct identification of the
physical structure of say, water, does not pass judgment on whether water is a
good or a bad thing, so does the correct identification of the nature of law remain
silent on whether having law is good or bad.
There are differences among the various defenses of descriptivism. One
difference in particular is of significance for my argument: some descriptivists
1

Among other endorsements of descriptivism see H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed.
(Oxford: Clarendon Press 1994) 239–44; Scott J. Shapiro, Legality (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 2011) 2–4; Larry Alexander & Emily Sherwin, The Rule of Rules: Morality, Rules,
and the Dilemmas of Law (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001) 204–09; John Gardner, Law as a
Leap of Faith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 23–24; Andrei Marmor, Philosophy of Law
(Princeton: Princeton University Press 2011) ch. 5; Jules L. Coleman, “Beyond the Separability
Thesis: Moral Semantics and the Methodology of Jurisprudence,” 27 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies
581, 597–608 (2007). Another defense of “descriptive jurisprudence” is found in Brian Leiter,
Naturalizing Jurisprudence: Essays on American Legal Realism and on Naturalism in Legal Philosophy
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 164–75, but there are some significant differences between
Letier’s views and those of other descriptivists, so my argument here is not directed at his views.
2
The main strategy of the leading anti-descriptivist, Ronald Dworkin, has been to argue that it
is impossible to distinguish clearly between these two types of question. If this were true, then
jurisprudential debates (and disagreements) would be unquestionably morally evaluative.
Dworkin’s claim has been vigorously denied by descriptivists. My argument does not depend on
this claim and to narrow the scope of potential disagreement with descriptivists I assume they are
correct on this point.
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contend that they describe “the concept of law,” while others claim to explain
“the nature of law,” or “law itself.” The distinction is often elided—Hart, to take
one prominent example, freely moved between talking about “the concept of
law” and the “nature of law”—but it will prove important. By the “concept” of
law I refer to something like people’s beliefs about law, roughly along the sense
psychologists use the term concept; by “nature,” I refer to the practice itself. The
argument I develop below is concerned with those theorists who purport to
explicate the nature of law.3 It is this understanding of descriptive jurisprudence
that is difficult to reconcile with the fact of persistent disagreement.
II
My argument, in brief, is that the existence and persistence of disagreements over
the nature of law gives us reason to doubt the claim that jurisprudential
disagreements are in fact descriptive in the sense identified above. Now,
unquestionably, that disagreements exist over a descriptive question is not
immediately a cause for concern, nor is it a reason to doubt the descriptiveness of
the question. I may disagree with you on what I take to be an unquestionably
descriptive question, say, the height of the Empire State Building. The
straightforward explanation for our disagreement is, typically, at least one of us is
mistaken. It is also typical of such disagreements, however, that they are not
persistent; all we need to do is find a source we accept as authoritative on the
matter, consult it and find who of us (if any) is right.
The mere fact of persistence also does not automatically warrant the
conclusion that the disagreements are not descriptive; but it does call for an
explanation. As I see it, there are four potential explanations for persistent
disagreements that are consistent with descriptivism. I call the first epistemic
deficiency. In cases of epistemic deficiency there is insufficient data on a matter
under consideration resulting in gaps that leave room for several competing
descriptive accounts. Currently, for example, there is disagreement among
evolutionary theorists on what provides a better account of the process of natural
selection, whether it is through slow, relatively constant, changes (a view called
“gradualism”), or whether it is in spurts of relatively quick change followed by
period of relative stasis (this is known as the “punctuated equilibria” view). This
is, at its core, an empirical question, but it is one for which much of the relevant
evidence is not available. If better data on Earth’s natural history were available,
scientists would be able to answer which of these two (if any) is correct. While the
debate in this example is still open, the history of science provides numerous

3
For claims to explicating the nature of law (law itself) rather than the concept of law see
Gardner, Law as a Leap of Faith, p. 276 n. 14; Michael S. Moore, Educating Oneself in Public:
Critical Essays in Jurisprudence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 311; Andrei Marmor,
“Farewell to Conceptual Analysis (in Jurisprudence),” in Wil Waluchow & Stefan Schiaraffa (eds),
Philosophical Foundations of the Nature of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) 209, 216–17.
For a very close argument see Joseph Raz, Between Authority and Interpretation: On the Theory of Law
and Practical Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 18–24.
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examples of scientific disputes that were resolved once more evidence became
available.
The second possible explanation for persistent descriptive disagreements is
the complexity of the object. The idea here is quite straightforward: The complexity
of the object of inquiry makes it difficult to provide an accurate description of it,
hence the potential for persistent disagreements. Applied to the domain of
jurisprudence, disagreements over what law is exist and persist because the
subject-matter to be explained—law—is very complex and disagreements result
from theorists’ endless struggle to get a better grasp of legal phenomena.
A third possible source of persistent descriptive disagreements may be,
explicitly or implicitly, the result of disagreement over values. I assume that even
the most committed moral realist will admit that there are persistent
disagreements over moral questions and that there is currently no agreed method
of resolving them. As a result, evaluative disagreements are difficult to resolve and
are typically persistent. Call these “moral evaluative disagreements.” On some
metaethical views moral evaluative disagreements are the result of epistemic
deficiency on moral matters, but for the moment I will assume this is not the
case. For those who believe that the source of disagreement on moral matters is
epistemic, moral evaluative disagreements are therefore a special case of what I
called epistemic deficiency. (I say something about this possibility below.)
The final possible source of persistent disagreement consistent with
descriptivism is what I call apparent disagreement. Apparent disagreements exist
when, despite appearances and disputants’ own beliefs, they do not in fact talk
about the same thing. For example, if two people disagree over whether Dworkin
thinks people have a right to pornography, their disagreement may be due to the
fact that one is talking about Ronald while the other about Andrea. Though
facetious, this example highlights an important point about apparent
disagreements, namely that though definitely possible, apparent disagreements
are less likely to persist as usually their nature can be discovered fairly quickly.
Indeed, those cases in which disagreements of this type persist are likely to be
cases of epistemic deficiency that leads disputants to mistakenly treat two
different things as though they were one (or as two different tokens of a single
type). As such, the only real cases of this source of disagreement are typically
going to be, once again, a special case of the first source of persistent
disagreement identified above. Nevertheless, because this case calls for some
independent consideration, I will consider apparent disagreements separately
below.
It is time to advance my argument against descriptivism. In a nutshell, it is
that descriptivism is a true and significant research program for jurisprudence only if the
source of disagreement among legal philosophers is epistemic deficiency or complexity; but
neither is a plausible explanation of jurisprudential disagreements. Hence,
jurisprudential descriptivism is either false or pointless. Let me now try and
substantiate this argument.
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III
I start with the explanation that seems most obviously inconsistent with
descriptivism, namely that jurisprudential disagreements persist because, at
bottom, they are disagreements over moral evaluative questions. The one great
virtue of this possibility is that it provides an easy answer to the puzzle of
persistent jurisprudential disagreements; on the other hand, this answer seems
inconsistent, in a fairly obvious manner, with descriptivism. This can be fairly
easily seen if we think of Dworkin’s challenge to legal positivism. In many of
Dworkin’s writings he focused on the fact of disagreement within the law (i.e.,
not the disagreements I am concerned with here) as an embarrassment to
positivist theories of law, and for which Dworkin’s view of law as a domain of
moral decision-making offered a ready answer. Moving this argument to the level
of jurisprudential discussion does not, at first sight, make any difference. That
seems to have been Dworkin’s own view, as in his later writings he relied on
something like this argument in support of the view that legal philosophy is
evaluative.4 If we accept that the reason why jurisprudential disagreements persist
is because they are moral, does this not immediately show that descriptivism is
false?
One way of trying to overcome this challenge is to adopt the view that
descriptivism requires only describing evaluative judgments, not making a moral
argument or taking a stand on an evaluative question. Such an argument has
been made for the sake of explaining how jurisprudence can remain descriptive in
the context of considering evaluative judgments within the law. As Hart put it,
“[d]escription may still be a description, even when what is described is an
evaluation.”5 But whatever are the merits of this view in the context of legal
philosophers’ describing the attitudes of those who take part in legal practice,6
this argument cannot be used when evaluative premises are, ex hypothesi, the
source of the disagreement among legal theorists. In such a case if one can
describe such evaluative attitudes in a morally neutral manner, then we would not
expect to see disagreement. If disagreements persist when describing a moral
attitude, we are once again facing the problem of explaining persistent
disagreements. Indeed, an admission that such disagreements are possible may be
a reason for doubting the claim that it is possible to describe a normative attitude
neutrally.
Another possibility might be to argue that the supposed contrast between
evaluative and descriptive disagreements is misleading, because evaluative
disagreements may be descriptive. To say of a sentence that it is evaluative, on
this view, is to say that it relates to questions of value, i.e. it is to say something
about the reference of the sentence. To say of a sentence that it is descriptive, on
the other hand, is to say something about its nature, to say, roughly, that it is
about a matter of fact. On this view, it is possible for a sentence to be evaluative
4

Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 2006) ch. 6.
Hart, Concept of Law, p. 244.
6
For some doubts see Danny Priel, “Evaluating Descriptive Jurisprudence,” 52 American
Journal of Jurisprudence 139, 148–50 (2007).
5
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(referring to value) and descriptive (factual) at the same time if we believe that
there are facts “in the world” on matters of value.7
Would accepting this possibility salvage descriptive jurisprudence? As a
historical matter, “descriptive jurisprudence” is associated with legal positivism,
and the latter has been attractive to some legal theorists, most famously H.L.A.
Hart, who were skeptical of claims of the descriptiveness of ethics, and whom I
suspect may have been attracted to descriptive jurisprudence exactly because it
was grounded on the firmer factual ground of social practice than on that of
morality. The point is, however, of interest beyond intellectual history.
Descriptive jurisprudence was premised on the idea that it is possible to give an
account of legal practice that is not grounded in morality, that jurisprudential
disputes were about the “classificatory” question of what counted as law. The
possibility considered here concedes that jurisprudential debates are, at least in
part, moral or political debates in disguise, but then tries to salvage descriptivism
by appealing to a controversial metaethical theory. Even if this theory is accepted,
it is doubtful whether it leaves more than the shell of descriptivism. Descriptivism
is based on the view that law is a social practice and as such explicable as a matter
of fact. On the reinterpretation under consideration, it turns out that this is false.
To accept this explanation for the persistence of jurisprudential debates is to
admit what has always been understood (by proponents and challengers of
descriptivism alike) to be the antithesis of descriptivism, namely that
jurisprudential debates really are moral or political disputes in disguise. What
does not change is that the disagreement is persistent and its persistence is due to
the fact that questions of value are impossible to resolve. To learn from a
metaethical theory that the debate is nevertheless descriptive because questions of
value are factual is small consolation indeed, if we cannot in any way ascertain
them. Put somewhat differently, the motivation for jurisprudential descriptivism
has been the belief that one need not engage in evaluation in jurisprudential
inquiry. That motivation does not change when we discover that evaluative
statements are factual and therefore, in the sense used in this section,
“descriptive.”
IV
I turn to consider the possibility that jurisprudential disagreements are apparent
disagreements. This may seem a surprising suggestion, for if true, that would
imply that many jurisprudential debates are in fact not genuine debates, that
much time and effort has been spent on debates in which disputants are in fact
arguing past each other. Another reason to doubt this explanation has much to

7
See Dan Priel, “Description and Evaluation in Jurisprudence,” 29 Law and Philosophy 633,
641–44 (2010). The questions of value are factual is related to the view that questions of value of
objective, but the link is complex. At least some moral objectivists, such as Dworkin, have insisted
that fact and value comprise of two separate domains. See Dworkin, Justice in Robes, pp. 76–78.
Consequently, for Dworkin questions of value were inherently contested and (in the sense used in
the text) non-descriptive. This is consistent with his “right answer thesis,” because of the
idiosyncratic meaning Dworkin gave this idea. See ibid., pp. 41–43.
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do with jurisprudential disagreement is that, as mentioned earlier, we expect such
disagreements to be resolved rather quickly, once the parties realize they do not
really disagree. To be persistent on this account, it has to be the case that
jurisprudential disagreements are apparent but those who engage in them do not
(and perhaps cannot) learn this fact.
Despite its apparent oddity, the suggestion that jurisprudential disagreements
are apparent should be fairly familiar. A common strategy for explaining away
several longstanding jurisprudential disagreements has been to argue that they are
the result of apparent disagreement. It has been suggested, for instance, that
natural lawyers are concerned with the case of moral or just law whereas legal
positivists seek to explain its less exalted instantiations; or to pick another wellknown example, it has been suggested that much of the disagreement between
legal positivists and Dworkin may simply reflect failure to notice that positivists
offer a theory of law and Dworkin a theory of adjudication.8 The first thing to
note about these suggestions is that they do not correspond to how natural
lawyers or Dworkin understand their own work: These critics of legal positivism
clearly considered their views a challenge to positivist views and when faced with
such conciliatory suggestions they flatly rejected them.9 But the issue is not
merely “biographical.” After all, it is possible that these theorists have
misunderstood their work or its implications. The heart of the matter is that
explanations of different aspects of a single phenomenon are, if they are both
true, complementary; indeed, necessarily so. Explaining jurisprudential
disagreement as the result of apparent disagreement of this sort requires us to
accept that virtually all legal theorists made not only the error of failing to notice
their accounts dealt with different matters, but also the further error of finding
conflicts among themselves when none existed. While not impossible, the
suggestion that such global misunderstanding is at the heart of all debates among
legal philosophers seems rather implausible. What is even more curious is that
such misunderstandings would persist (on what is said to be a descriptive matter)
even after the error has been pointed out. If that were the source of all
jurisprudential disagreements, one would wish to see an explanation as to why so
many intelligent legal theorists continue to get their own views so badly confused.
While I do not find these particular examples very compelling, I nevertheless
believe that apparent disagreements count for at least some persistent
disagreement in jurisprudence. The first important source of apparent
disagreement in jurisprudence is that legal philosophers have different views on
what counts as law, what belongs to the object to be explained. This is because
different legal theorists do not approach their theoretical inquiries with a clean
slate; rather, they enter into the debate with different assumptions on the sort of
things that belong to the object of inquiry. Some legal theorists, to make this
point less abstract, are pretheoretical “natural lawyers” and therefore do not
8

For examples of these strategies: With regard to natural law see Gardner, Law as a Leap of
Faith, pp. 51–53; with regard to Dworkin see ibid., p. 184.
9
See John Finnis, “Law and What I Truly Should Decide,” American Journal of Jurisprudence,
48 (2003) 107, 127–29; Dworkin, Justice in Robes, pp. 30–33, 162–68, 184–85.
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include unjust legislative prescriptions as part of the object to be explained while
others are pretheoretical “legal positivists,” who do. As a result of their different
starting points, they end up with conflicting descriptive theories, but because the
disagreement exists at a level that cannot be touched by their descriptive theories,
the disagreements persist. Apart from the problem of circularity (what justifies
those pretheoretical starting points?), to the extent that jurisprudential
disagreements are the result of such pretheoretical disagreements, it looks like no
descriptive theory can convince those not already committed to the starting point
it is based on, hence the persistence of (some) jurisprudential disagreements.
That is a serious problem for descriptivism, and it is the result of the fact that
unlike in the case of scientific description, there is neither an agreed-upon
“sample” on which different theorists can theorize, nor an agreed-upon
methodology that can be used to determine that sample without biasing the
conclusion in favor of one approach. As a result, it is always possible to dismiss
any potential counterexample to one’s theory as not really a case of law,
something that each side can do since what counts as law is not fixed in advance.
Even the choice of methodology for fixing the object of inquiry is itself suspect
and potentially question-begging for, once again, favoring one conclusion over
others. To give a concrete example: what role, if any, should prevailing attitudes
among people play in answering the question of the nature of law? We can
imagine at least three different answers: according to the first, prevailing attitudes
should play no role whatsoever, for the philosophical inquiry into the nature of
law is entirely separate from the sociological one; according to a second, we
should conduct surveys to examine people’s attitudes on the matter; and
according to a third, we should be interested in people’s attitudes on the matter,
but there is no need for surveys because the philosopher can rely on himself and
his own experiences as a guide for this question. (There are, of course, other
possibilities and variations on these three basic types.) Further complicating the
matter is the fact that these positions can relate to two levels of inquiry, that of
setting the object of inquiry and that of providing the explanatory (or descriptive)
theory. There are, therefore, at least six methodological positions, and different
legal theorists have expressed different views on the choice among them. And yet,
until we have been given a reason to favor one answer over others, the prospects
for descriptive jurisprudence that does not beg all important questions look grim.
Crucially for our purposes, the question of the choice between these possibilities
cannot itself be considered “descriptive.”
To avoid talking past each other legal philosophers will have to agree on a
“descriptive” (in this context: normatively neutral) way of deciding what counts
as law prior to beginning their theorizing. It is not clear how they can do that,
when the question what counts as law is exactly what the point of contention
among them. What is likely to happen is that each side will favor the
methodology that fits its preconceptions. In fact, I believe this is exactly what has
happened: much of the debate between legal positivists and anti-positivists these
days revolves implicitly around the question whether the question of the nature of
law is a question about explaining a social practice, or is part of a broader inquiry
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that involves addressing questions about nature and human nature.10 If one
adopts the former approach, the conclusion that law is a “social construction,”
nowadays taken by many legal positivists to be the core of their view, follows
almost inevitably. If one adopts the latter approach, that conclusion appears, at
the very least, incomplete.
This problem can be generalized: a central reason why jurisprudential
disagreements persist is because of underlying methodological issues: the point of
jurisprudence and philosophy, the nature of explanation in general and of social
phenomena in particular. These are wide-ranging issues, but if they have one
thing in common is that none of them can be called “descriptive.” (I return to
this issue below.)
Another possible source of apparent disagreement in jurisprudence is
mistaken generalizations. The problem here is that in spite of legal philosophers’
claims to generality, they are in fact often erroneously trying to generate an
account of the “nature” of law in general from the few legal systems they happen
to be familiar with, despite the fact that different legal systems—contrary to
descriptivists’ assumptions—do not share a single nature. On this view,
disagreement may be the result of different generalizations based on different
phenomena. Though this possibility is often dismissed out of hand by
descriptivists, I think something like it explains some jurisprudential
disagreements. There are fundamental differences between different legal systems
that reflect different understandings of what law is (differences that ultimately
arise from different normative views on the role of law, as well as differences in
the social, political, and technological environment), and that some of the
disagreements among legal philosophers, as well as their persistence, are the
result of failure to take such differences into account.11
Those who reject this claim may raise two valid challenges: First, to claim
that different legal systems belong to different kinds must presuppose some way
of individuating legal systems, something that the arguments about circularity
mentioned earlier preclude. Even if this problem is overcome, a second challenge
arises, namely, why would such disagreements persist when the information on
the locality of explanation is readily available? The brief answer to the first
challenge is that it is possible to individuate legal systems to different “types” on
evaluative grounds, i.e. exactly in a way that is not available to the descriptivist.
My response to the second challenge is the “sociological” observation that most
legal philosophers, and especially so these days, do not seem particularly
interested in actual law beyond their (often limited) knowledge of their own legal
system, nor do they take particular interest in those disciplines (comparative law,
legal anthropology, and legal history) that provide the relevant information for
assessing such a claim.
10
See Dan Priel, “Toward Classical Legal Positivism” (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1886517.
11
See Dan Priel, “Is There One Right Answer to the Question of the Nature of Law?” in
Philosophical Foundations of the Nature of Law, 322. For examples of dismissal of such a claim see
Shapiro, Legality, pp. 16–17; Moore, Educating Oneself in Public, pp. 80–81.
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I do not want to spend too much time on this issue or press it too strongly,
because the relevance of this observation is tangential for the matter at hand. If I
am wrong about it, that simply means that one potential source for explaining the
source of jurisprudential disagreement is unavailable. If it is true, descriptivism
may remain a viable possibility on a more local level, once we distinguish between
the different phenomena put together under the same label, “law.” But even if we
accept this possibility, the difficulties for descriptivism are far from over. First,
deciding whether two different phenomena are two tokens of the same type is not
something that can be done by mere observation and description, as different
phenomena in the world do not come with labels attached to them. Therefore,
adopting this as an explanation for jurisprudential disagreement will require
justifying which of the differences between various specimens of law are
differences between tokens of the same type and which are separate types. This
means that the problems identified at the level of general jurisprudence cannot be
avoided by attempting to defend descriptivism on a smaller scale. Distinguishing
between different types within the category “law” will require an underlying
theory, which brings back the problem of circularity mentioned above.
Even if we manage to overcome this problem, it will still require a major
change in descriptivism. Recall that one of the two central elements of
descriptivism is that it offers a general description of law. This is no small thing.
Describing the important elements of particular legal systems is exactly the sort of
thing descriptivists themselves claim not to be doing, the sort of task they consider
as the appropriate domain of empirical social scientists.12 Therefore, narrowing
down the aims of descriptive jurisprudence in this way will raise doubts on its
very point and will presumably call for some fundamental changes in the methods
legal philosophers use. In particular, one would expect their work to be much
more grounded in empirical facts on particular legal systems than it currently is.
V
I turn now to epistemic deficiency and complexity as possible reconciliations of
persistent jurisprudential disagreements with descriptivism. Let me start with the
first possibility, because it is a more evidently implausible explanation for
jurisprudential disagreement. As far as I know, there are no constitutions to be
unearthed, statutes whose content awaits interpretation, or any other missing
facts that if found would bring any open jurisprudential question to an end. To
be sure, we do not know everything that can be known about all historical forms
of law, just as we do not know many aspects of life in ancient times. But that is
besides my point, because there is no suggestion that certain currently open
jurisprudential disputes on the nature of law would be resolved if only we had
some information about ancient legal systems we currently lack. That is not just
my own view. Unlike cases of scientific epistemic deficiency when scientists can
tell what evidence will resolve an open scientific dispute (and when possible they
12
See Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays in Law and Morality, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2009) 44, 104–05; Shapiro, Legality, pp. 406–07 n. 16; Gardner, Law as a Leap of
Faith, pp. 177, 193–94.
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often go on to construct and conduct experiments in an attempt to gather it), I
know of no suggestion from any jurisprudential descriptivist that any presently
open jurisprudential disagreement will be resolved if only certain facts become
known.
It is this crucial difference between jurisprudential and scientific
disagreements that explains why Scott Shapiro’s recent attempt to explain
jurisprudential disagreements is inapt. According to Shapiro, “[j]ust as two
detectives can disagree about which suspect committed the crime, two
philosophers can disagree about what makes an entity the thing that it is.”13 In his
scenario disagreement is possible because it is the result of epistemic deficiency.
Even if the available evidence renders several possible scenarios equally plausible,
we can conceive of additional evidence that would have shown which of the
detectives (if any) is right. In his scenario, for example, a security camera installed
at the crime scene could have resolved the detectives’ disagreements. There is
simply nothing comparable in jurisprudence.
Complexity is a more serious possibility. Here, if you wish, the source of the
disagreement is not the insufficiency of data but the insufficiency of legal
theorists’ cognitive capacities. Obviously, this is a possibility that can never be
ruled out, but I think it provides little assistance to defenders of descriptivism. To
see why, we need to look a bit more closely at the potential sources of complexity
and their implications for jurisprudential disagreement. In general we can
distinguish between complexity of the explanandum and complexity of the
explanans. I begin with the former.
Though superficially appealing, the complexity of the explanandum actually
fits jurisprudential disagreements rather poorly. Legal phenomena are indeed
multifaceted and varied; nonetheless, their complexity should not be exaggerated.
Law is not quantum mechanics (about which Richard Feynman is reputed to
have said: “if you think you understand quantum mechanics you don’t
understand quantum mechanics”). When one examines jurisprudential
disagreements, they are not normally accusations of ignoring some facts or of
leaving out some aspect of a complex phenomenon, but are rather the result of
challenging a competing explanation of the same, typically not exceptionally
complex, set of facts. A related difficulty with this explanation lies not with what
we see in jurisprudential debates, but with what we do not. If it had really been
the complexity of the explained phenomena that accounted for jurisprudential
disagreement we would have expected to see the sort of progress we do see in the
paradigm of “descriptive” inquiries, science, where complex theories are built up
from an accumulation of answers to small-scale and typically less controversial
questions. There is, however, no such accumulation of accepted answers in
jurisprudence. I cannot think of a single small-scale problem that has been solved
to (virtually) everyone’s satisfaction. In fact, there is not even agreement on wrong
answers. Among prominent legal philosophers today some believe coercion is
essential to law, others do not; some believe that the gunman situation writ large
13

Shapiro, Legality, p. 18.
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can under certain situations be a legal system, while others deny this; some
believe that morality is necessarily connected to law, others firmly deny this. The
list goes on and on. These disagreements are hard to square with the suggestion
that the source of such disagreements is due to the complexity of law.
There is a different potential source of legal complexity that may be of greater
explanatory power, but unfortunately for descriptivists, if it is true, it undermines
descriptivism in a different way. One reason why law may be complex is that it
was the product of the workings of many people in different times and places,
holding very different and often conflicting views on law, society, morals and
politics. Their different views have not just been exogenous evaluations of legal
phenomena; rather, these beliefs influenced actions within the law and thereby
helped shape what law is. This resulted in a practice within which one finds, say,
“positivistic” aspects alongside “non-positivistic” ones, because those who give
shape to legal phenomena (legislators, judges, lawyers, lay people) have reshaped
legal practice on the basis of their conflicting beliefs. Unlike the complexity in the
practical aspects of law, which legal philosophers tend to ignore as irrelevant, this
diversity of views touches on the very issues they are concerned to illuminate.
The different attitudes of those involved in the law lead to a social practice that is
constantly being pulled in different directions. Legal philosophers typically ignore
this diversity of views, treating, say, Cicero’s claims about the nature of law as
external observations about the nature of law (which they can then assess as true
or false), and not the statements of a legal insider whose beliefs also contributed
to the constitution of what law is.
This complexity provides a straightforward explanation for some
jurisprudential disagreements—different descriptivists have their own views about
law and they (naturally) highlight in their accounts those features that align with
these views and neglect those that do not—but in doing so it also provides what
may be the greatest challenge to descriptivism. For if the possibility just outlined
is true, conflicting jurisprudential descriptivists are all wrong for ignoring this
complexity and offering overly simplified, incomplete, and for that reason
erroneous, accounts of law. In short, if law is complex in this sense, then the
overly neat and organized accounts legal philosophers give us are not faithful
descriptions of the nature of law, but are explanations simplified and sanitized to
such a degree that the result cannot plausibly be called a “description” of their
purported object.
The only way to avoid this conclusion is to argue that beyond all the
differences among legal practitioners there is a core that all agree on and that it is
this core of legal practice that legal philosophers can and should describe. There
are, however, at least three problems with this suggestion. First, this claim needs
to be shown rather assumed; second, it is not easy to both maintain this claim
and the one that remaining disagreements among legal philosophers are about the
description of this supposedly uncontroversial core; and finally, this core, even if
it exists, is likely to be so thin that it will not capture anything that could be
plausibly called the “nature” of law, which is what descriptivists purport to be
after.
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What about the complexity of the explanans? There are considerable
difficulties with this possibility as well. Legal philosophers typically leave out from
their discussions much of what makes law complex. According to descriptivists
the philosophical question of the nature of law is understood as the search for
law’s necessary features or its existence conditions. Consequently, much of the
diversity (and hence complexity) of real-world legal phenomena is off bounds as
far as most legal philosophers are concerned. In fact, to the extent that the
complexity of legal phenomena still remains a problem that leads to persistent
jurisprudential disagreements, it casts doubt on the appropriateness of
philosophical method as a means for dealing with the task of a descriptive
account of law. Philosophy is not the only (and typically not the primary) method
for describing social phenomena (as opposed to the question of the explaining the
ontological status of social phenomena, of what makes them possible). If
descriptive jurisprudence fails so spectacularly at providing determinate and
agreed-upon answers to the question of describing the essence of a familiar social
practice, this gives us reason to doubt whether it is the right tool for the task. In
other words, claiming that jurisprudence is descriptive and explaining
jurisprudential disagreements as a result of the complexity of law, when coupled
with the failure of this enterprise to generate uncontroversial descriptions of even
the most basic aspects of law, will tend to suggest that the problem lies in the
method used to describe the phenomenon: specifically, the inadequacy of the
fact-thin methods of legal philosophers in addressing and describing the factual
complexity of the social phenomena they are investigating.
VI
The following table summarizes the different explanations considered in this
essay for explaining jurisprudential disagreements and the reason why each of
them undermines descriptivism:
Explanation of the disagreement
Problem for descriptivism
Evaluative moral disagreement
Descriptivism is straightforwardly false.
Evaluative epistemic disagreements
Debates in jurisprudence are pointless
so long as theorists do not find the right
way of explaining law.
Apparent disagreement
Implausible as an explanation of
disagreement; but if true disagreement
is pointless and trying to resolve the
disagreement undermines the
motivation for analytic jurisprudence.
Epistemic deficiency
Unlikely explanation of jurisprudential
disagreements.
Complexity of legal phenomena
Does not fit most jurisprudential
disagreements; and if true undermines
philosophy as a method for getting to
the truth.
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If the arguments just summarized are along the right lines, we have reason to
doubt that the branch of jurisprudence that purports to be descriptive is indeed
so, because descriptive debates only manifest persistence under certain
conditions, none of which pertains to jurisprudential debates.
I consider now several possible objections to my argument. The first, one that
I treat briefly, is that even though each explanation considered above in isolation
cannot explain why jurisprudence is descriptive, some combination of them can.
Or it might be contended that I failed to consider an argument for explaining the
persistence of jurisprudential disagreement that will satisfy committed
descriptivists. Both challenges are, of course, possible. Without more, all I can
say is that these challenges are empty without further details. In any case, even if
ultimately unsuccessful, the argument of this essay should prove helpful in
making sense of the terrain of descriptive jurisprudence and for a more fruitful
discussion of its merits.
The second possible objection, one that I encountered in one form or another
from several readers, is that my arguments must be false, because if true, they
bring down with them not just descriptive jurisprudence but the whole of
philosophy. After all, if there is one thing that has characterized philosophy
throughout all its history is the intractability of its questions and the persistence
of its debates. Phrased in more positive terms, it may be argued that there is
something inherently intractable about philosophical debates, and that my
arguments miss this feature of philosophical debates by treating them as though
they were empirical. The first thing to say in response is that it is (usually) no
answer to a crime to say that others are guilty of it as well; and labeling a debate
“philosophical” does not relieve it of normative standards relevant to other
inquiries. It bears asking why philosophical debates are persistent, why some ageold questions of philosophy are still with us. It is also notable that those that do
not, have usually been answered by other disciplines. If all this means that a
branch of philosophy, or even all of it, cannot be salvaged, so be it. But, in any
case, I do not actually think that all of philosophy similarly affected by my
arguments. Few philosophers these days, as far as I know, call their work
“descriptive.” Even if we expand this category to mean “conceptual,” then
conceptual analysis has met with hard times, from philosophers perhaps more
than anyone else. It has its defenders too, but to argue that all philosophical
reflection is a form of conceptual analysis (which is what this challenge amounts
to) is an unlikely claim. Whatever may be the faults in those branches of
philosophy that do not purport to be descriptive, the arguments presented in this
essay do not affect them.
More specifically, when considered more closely, it is at least arguable that
some of the rejected explanations for the persistence of jurisprudential debates
are available for explaining the persistence of other philosophical debates. Some
debates in philosophy probably persist because of epistemic deficiency (some
questions in the philosophy of mind are likely examples, as are some aspects in
the debate over free will). More importantly, the arguments presented here do
not affect all branches of normative philosophy. If, for instance, general

14

jurisprudential explanations were modeled on something like reflective
equilibrium, the argument presented here would have left it largely unscathed.
(That is not to say that the method of reflective equilibrium has not had its
critics, only that those criticisms are unrelated to the ones raised here against
descriptivism.) But to think of jurisprudence on the reflective equilibrium model
means thinking of it as a normative inquiry. True, reflective equilibrium starts
with prevailing understandings of our practices and checks them against our
intuitions, but it is a normative endeavor that seeks to justify and improve our
practices. Further, the method of reflective equilibrium is justified for its ability to
offer reinterpretations of familiar concepts that are normatively attractive, thereby
providing a framework for improving human institutions. This is very different
from descriptive jurisprudence.
A different objection is that I have missed my target, because in fact even
descriptivists concede the role of evaluation in jurisprudential inquiry: what they
reject is that those values are moral or political.14 Real jurisprudential
descriptivists, then, can accept that a main source of jurisprudential disagreement
is evaluative, but deny that it is moral evaluation. Call this view “weak
descriptivism.”15
For reasons I explained in some detail elsewhere, I believe weak descriptivism
is an unstable and indefensible position,16 but we can largely ignore these
arguments here. We can assume that weak descriptivism is sound. In one recently
popular version of weak descriptivism, jurisprudential theory requires making
judgments of importance.17 Though I have not encountered this specific
argument from defenders of this view, one might try to explain the persistence of
jurisprudential disagreement on disagreements on what aspects of legal
phenomena are important.
This suggestion may seem promising at first, but it suffers from several
significant difficulties. It is worth pointing out first it simply does not correspond
to jurisprudential discourse. Pick any of the most prominent works in
jurisprudence of the last few decades: arguments in it are not typically that other
legal theorists give too much or too little weight to certain aspects of law; it is that
competing views are wrong. This is hard to reconcile with the claim that
evaluative disagreements in jurisprudence are all based on different judgments of
14
Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays on the Morality of Law and Politics, rev. ed.
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) 237; Julie Dickson, Evaluation and Legal Theory (Oxford: Hart,
2001).
15
Some may have qualms about attaching the label “descriptivism” to this view given that it
accepts the role of some values in jurisprudential theorising. The label does not matter much, of
course, but in calling this view descriptive I follow the view of some self-styled descriptivists who
allow for this form of evaluation in their account. See e.g., Marmor, Philosophy of Law, p. 124;
Leiter, Naturalizing Jurisprudence, pp. 174–75; Alexander & Sherin, Rule of Rules, p. 207; H.L.A.
Hart, “Comment,” in Ruth Gavison (ed.), Issues in Contemporary Legal Philosophy: The Influence of
H.L.A. Hart (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987) 35, 39.
16
See Priel, “Description and Evaluation in Jurisprudence”; Dan Priel, “Evaluating Descriptive
Jurisprudence,” 52 American Journal of Jurisprudence 139 (2007).
17
Dickson, Evaluation, pp. 51–69; cf. Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of Principle: In Defence of a
Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 196–97.
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importance. A second difficulty with this suggestion is that different emphases
should not lead to conflicts. It is normally not difficult to recognize that two
accounts that differ simply in how much they highlight different aspects of a
single phenomenon. Therefore, for this to count as the source of jurisprudential
disagreements what is needed is the further assumption that these different
judgments of importance have been globally mistaken for something else. As I see
it, the most likely reason why this might be so is if different judgments of
importance is if they affect legal practice, i.e. if judging certain features of law to
be more important than others leads to a somewhat different legal practice. But
this explanation is fundamentally at odds with descriptivism, for it suggests that
legal philosophers do not stand outside legal practice merely observing and
describing it, but rather (inadvertently or not) they take a stand—a normative
stand—between different possible forms that legal practice takes. That would
show that judgments of importance are in fact implicit judgments as to the
relative merits of different forms of legal practice.
Assume, however, that I am wrong about all this too, i.e. that the source of
jurisprudential disagreement is evaluative and exclusively confined to
disagreement over assessments of the important features of law. Accepting this as
the source of persistent jurisprudential disagreements will prove a pyrrhic victory
for the descriptivist, for if this is the case, that will render jurisprudential disputes
beyond argument. As far as I know there is no way of adjudicating between
judgments of importance, for they are subjective: if I think that certain features of
law that I find important vindicate “natural law theory” and you think that other
features that you find important lead to “legal positivism,” it is hard to see the
point of us debating our views, because each can only be assessed relative to
those judgments of importance, and those judgments themselves are beyond
dispute. Descriptivists must implicitly accept this point, because if they did not,
they would probably address this question and suggest a way of identifying
correct and incorrect judgments of importance in order to resolve jurisprudential
disputes in this way. I know of no attempt to do that.18
Perhaps, however, this focus on judgments of importance is insufficiently
narrow. Perhaps jurisprudential disagreements are the result of competing
epistemic values. This is a more plausible version of weak descriptivism, but
again I find it unlikely that it is only epistemic values that explain jurisprudential
disagreements. They definitely do not seem that way. Those who propose this as
the source of persistent jurisprudential disagreements need to show how
evaluative disagreements about the nature of a normative institution such as law
can steer clear of moral or political considerations. I would further wish to see an
18
I raise in a note a related problem. Charles Taylor has argued that judgments of “import” are
embedded in a particular worldview. See Charles Taylor, “Self-Interpreting Animals,” in Human
Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985) 45. As
the title of his essay indicates, this argument is particularly pressing for those who claim (and this
includes many descriptivists) that jurisprudence is a hermeneutical endeavor concerned with “selfunderstanding.” If Taylor is right, the possibility of “objective” (in this context: cross-culturallysimilar or even interpersonally-similar) judgments of importance, and hence of explanation of social
phenomena that depend on such judgments, looks rather suspect.

16

argument demonstrating how virtually all jurisprudential disagreements are the
result of disagreement over epistemic values. It is worth highlighting in this
context that disagreements of this sort are likely to result from different views
about the proper way of explaining human action, and that such disagreements
are themselves not easily disentangled from moral and political questions. (As an
example consider debates about the relationship between rationality and
morality.)
However, for the sake of argument, as before, I am willing to grant the
assumption that moral evaluative considerations do not form any part of the
evaluative considerations that affect persistent jurisprudential disagreements.
Once again, an immediate implication of this view is that most debates among
legal philosophers are misguided, although this time for a somewhat different
reason than before: it follows from this version of weak descriptivism that
disagreements among legal philosophers that purport to be about the nature of
law are actually competing views about explanation, either in general or of human
action. While I happen to think that some jurisprudential disagreements are in
fact the result of different views on the nature of (good) explanation, it is hard to
see how a defender of jurisprudential descriptivism will find solace in this view.
Accepting it implies that to the extent that jurisprudential disagreements are the
result of epistemic evaluative disagreements, legal philosophers should turn away
from the debates they have been engaged in and turn to the matters that are really
behind their disagreements, i.e. the appropriate method for explaining human
behavior, action, and institutions.
The second potential challenge to my argument is that the source of
evaluative disagreement is epistemic deficiency on matters of value. This is the
possibility mentioned briefly at the beginning of the essay, according to which
evaluative disagreements are a special case of epistemic deficiency. I do not think
this is a very popular view, but it has its adherents; Ronald Dworkin, for example,
may have been one of them. As I understand him, Dworkin believes legal and
moral disagreements exist because we lack the powers of his imaginary judge
Hercules, and correspondingly, that all such disagreements would have
disappeared had we been omniscient like him. Would adopting this view make a
difference to the question at hand? Technically, the answer is clearly “No,”
because jurisprudential disagreements will still be evaluative, and more
specifically, morally evaluative. More importantly, to try and explain the
prevalence of jurisprudential disagreements within a descriptivist framework by
appealing to this consideration implies that descriptivists should dedicate all their
efforts to non-jurisprudential questions. On this view jurisprudential debates are
ethical or metaethical debates masquerading as debates about the nature of law
and there is little hope for one side convincing the other of the truth of its views
until we find the truth regarding certain ethical questions. Put somewhat
differently, accepting this view implies that jurisprudential debates should look
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much more like Dworkin’s work in jurisprudence, work that has been, decidedly
and consciously, non-descriptivist.19
VII
So far I have presented reasons to doubt the claim that jurisprudence is
descriptive and considered several possible counterarguments. I wish to conclude
with a positive explanation of the debates that make up what is said to be
descriptive, or conceptual, jurisprudence in a way that will make sense of their
persistence.
Calling jurisprudence descriptive suggests that there exists a well-defined
object that exists before the inquiry. That is indeed the assumption, usually
implicit, one finds in the work of descriptivists. Raz, for instance, has stated that
it is a mistake to think that “legal philosophy creates the concept of law” when
“in fact it merely explains the concept that exists independently of it.”20 We have
seen, however, that because there is no clearly-defined object, descriptive
jurisprudence suffers from a fatal flaw of circularity, which can be avoided when
we abandon this assumption. If we accept that law is a human creation, then
what belongs in that category is itself determined by human attitudes. Though
this is almost a truism among contemporary legal philosophers, especially legal
positivists, the full implications of this idea have not been considered. The most
significant one for present purposes is that since (for the most part) humans have
no need for a clear-cut classification of law and non-law, there simply is no
answer within the object itself to many of the questions that have been at the
heart of descriptive jurisprudence, because there are no (consistent) human
attitudes about them. This implies that there is no answer to many of the
“descriptive” questions at the heart of contemporary conceptual jurisprudence—
Questions like: Is law necessarily coercive? Can moral norms be incorporated into
the law? Are sanctions necessary for law?—because humans have not had any
need to come up with answers to them. To give just one example, the claim that
the concept of law does not necessarily involve sanctions has been challenged
using thought experiments involving non-human societies. But since humans,
whose attitudes constitute the object on which legal philosophers supposedly
apply their conceptual analysis skills, have not troubled themselves with the
question of law in non-human societies (the law of human societies giving them
enough to worry about), it is a mistake to draw any inference from whatever it is
one imagines is the right answer to these thought experiments, to any inquiry into
the nature of law.
The only way out of this is to try to describe not simply a human practice, but
an idealization of it. Now, here there are two ways of identifying that ideal. One is
19
Incidentally, such an explanation for jurisprudential disagreements will also require
abandoning the claim made by some prominent descriptivists that legal positivism is neutral
between different metaethical views. See H.L.A. Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983) 78; Joseph Raz, “Legal Principles and the Limits of Law”
in Marshall Cohen (ed.), Ronald Dworkin and Contemporary Jurisprudence (London: Duckworth,
1984) 73, 85.
20
Joseph Raz, Between Authority and Interpretation, p. 85.
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an attempt to strip from the practice what the theorist considers its underlying
ideal. That, I trust it is clear, involves exactly the normative inquiry that
descriptivists claim is not part of their inquiry. The difficulty is that the practice
underdetermines its ideal and that consequently there is an infinite number of
possible idealizations of it. The other possibility is that the ideal of law is itself an
attitude the theorist tries to identify. On this view real-life law is a pale image of
an abstract idea of law that the humans whose attitudes have constituted legal
practice have created them with a certain ideal in mind. In that case, we might
think of a “descriptive,” even “sociological” inquiry of this ideal. I take it that
such ideals have indeed occupied lawyers and philosophers. The problem here,
however, is not of a lack of an object to describe, but of a glut. History shows
they have had many such ideals, and the choice among them inevitably takes us
beyond description.
All different ways of understanding jurisprudential practice thus show it to
involve some kind of interpretation of the practice, i.e. the attempt to look at the
practice and identify what is central to it and why this is so. This explanation
seems plausible on its own: the most “descriptive” jurisprudence involves the
sifting and organizing of certain facts as relevant, essential, important,
illuminating and so on, from an infinite number of facts. This process is not
descriptive, for making those judgments requires taking a certain normative
perspective. It also provides a ready and simple explanation for our puzzle of
persistent jurisprudential disagreement. Indeed, it does so while also explaining
why such disagreements are often presented as though they are disagreement over
a “descriptive” question. This is so, because such accounts appear to give us an
account of what the practice “is,” not what it should be. These competing
interpretations are thus normative, grounded in whatever normative
considerations the theorist more-or-less explicitly recognizes as relevant for this
inquiry. The persistence of jurisprudential disagreement is made possible by the
fact that there is indeterminacy at all levels of this inquiry: of what belongs to the
object of inquiry, of the standards by which to assess it, the content of those
normative standards, the weighting of such different standards, and so on.
I thus reach, relying on a somewhat different argument, a conclusion that is
quite similar to the one reached by Ronald Dworkin. But Dworkin has made the
further claim that jurisprudence is political in the sense that this shows that
jurisprudence is part of political philosophy. Is this extra step warranted? If we
agree that different “descriptive” theories of law are in fact different
interpretations of legal practice, the question remains as to the relevant standard.
In some loose and not very illuminating way we can talk of here of “importance”
as the relevant standard, but if we try and consider what is important about law,
it is safe to say, I think, without prejudicing my answer in favor of any view, that
law is related to concepts like authority, morality, coercion, and legitimacy. All
these are political concepts. Thus, any interpretation of what law is (what is
important, illuminating, central, and so on about it) will require explaining how
these concepts (or at least some of them) relate to law and to each other. Even if
there is a descriptive component to such an inquiry, it is probably a minor part of
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it, and cannot be the whole of it. Thus, even if not all interpretation of social
practices is political, the interpretation of law is.
VIII
Even if all this is convincing, one may wonder why any of this matters. My real
concern is broader than the seemingly technical question of whether
descriptivism is defensible or not. My hope is that this essay will persuade readers
of the need to turn away from descriptivism, because I believe descriptivism has
led legal philosophers to spend an inordinate amount of time and energy on the
wrong questions, and, perhaps worse, try to answer them, in ways that did not
contribute to better understanding law. Given what I have just said, this claim
requires some explanation. After all, if, as I have just contended, jurisprudential
debates really are something different from what those engaged in them claim
them to be, then the problem may not be with the debates themselves, only with
their characterization. But the characterization of debates as conceptual does
have very deleterious effects on jurisprudence. They involve many scholars
engaged in questions for which the characterization offered here shows there is no
“descriptive” or “conceptual” answer; they deepen the separation of
jurisprudence from political philosophy and encourage the view that in answering
questions in jurisprudence one should, as much as possible, stay clear of
normative debates. As a result the descriptive bias in contemporary jurisprudence
has led to the wrong answers to fundamental questions in jurisprudence and to
the isolation of jurisprudence from legal practice, from the rest of legal academia,
and even from the rest of contemporary philosophy.
Part of the dominance of conceptual jurisprudence has involved the creation
of an invented history, in which philosophers of past centuries, especially those
considered founders of legal positivism, have had their philosophy of law made to
fit descriptivist strictures leading to characterizations of their thought that bear
only a tenuous relationship with their actual ideas. This is true of Hobbes, of
Bentham, even to some extent of John Austin. This essay does not attempt to
spell out what an alternative view of jurisprudence should look like, but these
examples (to which one can add many more) suffice to establish one point: that
the range of possibilities and views one could find in legal philosophy is as wide as
what one finds within political philosophy. Under this characterization of
jurisprudence the puzzle of persistent jurisprudential disagreements will no longer
be a mystery, or at least not a greater mystery than the existence of persistent
disagreements among political philosophers. More importantly, thus understood,
the point of engaging in these persistent debates will become much easier to
understand. On this view jurisprudential arguments will be understood not as
attempts to describe law, but rather as attempts to persuade others of the
superiority of a particular way of understanding and organizing legal phenomena
based on a broader view on how life in a political community should be lived and
the role law should play in it. Some works will be “interpretive” in that they will
try to work by offering a politically-informed reading of existing practices; other
works will be purely “prescriptive” or “normative” as they will try to articulate a
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characterization of justified legal practices independently of such practices. None
should be “descriptive.”
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